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CONCLUSION
It should be emphasized that when confronted with an obstinate, obdurate and
unregenerate defendant, a more detailed remedy is needed ... when a defendant exhibits a
stubborn and perverse resistance to change, extensive court-ordered relief is both
necessary and proper.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a prison where prisoners are bound with “fetal” restraints,2 chained to toilets,3

and locked naked in outdoor cages.4 A prison in which inmate bones are broken,5 their skulls are

1

Honorable William Wayne Justice, The Two Faces of Judicial Activism, Address at the George Washington
University National Law Center (Mar. 10, 1992), in 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 7 (1992) (Judge Justice was one of
the Texas District Court judges involved in lengthy and ongoing litigation over unconstitutional state prison
conditions in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)).
2
Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1168 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (describing fetal restraint protocol as “handcuffing an
inmate’s hands at the front of his body, placing him in leg irons, and then drawing a chain between the handcuffs
and legs until only a few inches separate the bound wrists and ankles”).
3
Id. at 1169.
4
Id. at 1171.
5
Id. at 1165 (detailing a guard applying enormous force to break a prisoner’s arm in order to inflict pain rather than
assert control); id. at 1163 (observing that a correctional officer repeatedly punched an inmate until blood started
shooting out of the inmate’s mouth resulting in a fractured jaw).
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lacerated,6 and where they are bathed in boiling water until their skin peels off.7 A prison where
inmates are extracted from their cells with shotguns that fire rubber blocks, tasers, batons, and
mace.8 A place where a “code of silence” reigns9 and administrative authorities regularly turn a
blind eye to the ritualized infliction of pain by prison guards.10 A place where guidelines about
the use of firearms or lethal force are routinely violated11 and where no warning shots are
permitted – guards must shoot to injure if confronted with violence.12
The prison is neither Abu Ghraib nor Guantanomo Bay, but rather Pelican Bay State
Prison, located in northwest California.13 In 1990, just one year after the prison opened, a class of
prisoners confined in Pelican Bay Prison’s Secure Housing Unit (SHU) brought suit under the
federal Civil Rights Act of 187114 challenging the constitutionality of the conditions of their
confinement in Madrid v. Gomez.15 At the conclusion of the trial, after more than fifty-seven
witnesses had testified, and more than six-thousand exhibits had been entered into evidence,16
Judge Thelton Henderson appointed a Special Master to monitor prison conditions at Pelican
Bay and to work with plaintiffs and defendants to develop a remedial plan addressing numerous
Constitutional violations.17 The court would retain jurisdiction over conditions of confinement at
Pelican Bay Prison until “all Constitutional violations found [through the litigation] have been

6

Id. at 1162 (describing the first of many factual scenarios in a section entitled “Staff Assaults on Inmates”).
Id. at 1166-67.
8
Id. at 1172-78 (noting that cell extractions are viewed as “opportunities to punish, and inflict pain upon, the inmate
population for what were often minor rules violations”).
9
Id. at 1164.
10
Id. at 1177 (quoting Charles Fenton, former warden of the federal super-maximum prison Marion Penitentiary and
witness for the plaintiffs). This was the only case in which Warden Fenton testified on behalf of an inmate class. Id.
11
Id. at 1179.
12
Id. at 1184 (quoting Pelican Bay Prison Associate Warden Garcia).
13
Id. at 1155.
14
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2004).
15
889 F. Supp. at 1155.
16
Id. at 1156.
17
Id. at 1282-83.
7
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fully and effectively remedied.”18 As of May 2005, more than eleven years after the trial began,
the court continued to maintain jurisdiction.19
Judge Henderson uncovered the horrific abuse20 in Pelican Bay’s SHU during an active
fact-finding process. Before the trial commenced, Judge Henderson spent two days touring
Pelican Bay.21 He also maintained an active role supervising and approving the implementation
of the remedy – eventually threatening a federal court takeover of the California Department of
Corrections to correct systemic problems, including the undue influence and abuse of power by
the California Correctional Peace Officers Association (CCPOA).22
Critics of the type of judicial intervention undertaken by Judge Henderson decry such
federal court actions as "activist" and outside the realm of legitimate judicial decision-making.23
Such criticisms in the context of prison reform led to the passage of the Prison Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 (PLRA), which limited the power of federal courts to intervene in state prison
systems.24 The PLRA was promulgated as a solution to the perceived problems of runaway
prisoner litigation and abuse of federal court power25 and the Act’s proponents sought to leave
the reform of state prisons to state political processes.26 However, Congress passed the PLRA on

18

Id. at 1283.
Madrid v. Woodford, No. C90-3094-T.E.H., Order Re (1) Special Master's Report Re "Post Powers"
Investigations and Employee Discipline, and (2) CCPOA's Motion to Intervene (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2004).
20
See notes 2-12, 223 and accompanying text.
21
Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1156 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
22
See discussion infra Part III.A.
23
The critique of federal courts as activist has been levied by both liberals and conservatives, see Michael C. Dorf,
After Bureaucracy, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1247-1248 (2004) (reviewing MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (2003); compare Honorable William Rehnquist, Decisions Shouldn’t Lead to Judges
Impeachments, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 24, 2005 at B5 (defending judicial independence and articulating the view
that the framers of the Constitution wanted to protect judicial independence and that judicial decisionmaking should
not be swayed by popular opinion); but see MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING
AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS 1-13 (1998).
24
See discussion infra Part II.B.
25
See discussion infra Part II.B.
26
See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1559 (2003) (indicating that the PLRA was
driven in part by conservative dissatisfaction with “imperial” or activist judging).
19
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mistaken assumptions about the nature of prisoner litigation27 and improvidently eliminated
enforcement mechanisms designed to ensure the Constitutionality of state prison policies.28
By limiting federal court power to hear prisoner cases, Congress ensured an upsurge in
Constitutional violations of individual prisoner rights.29 Indeed, prisoner abuse claims have risen
since the passage of the PLRA as the political power of prison authorities and guards has grown
and their control of state prison systems has been consolidated.30 Prisoners are increasingly shut
out of the political process, especially in states that disenfranchise and otherwise hinder the
social participation of convicted felons.31 This lack of political power guarantees that
majoritarian political processes remain an ineffective prisoner rights enforcement mechanism.32
A comparison of the critique of federal judges as activist and the assumptions underlying the
PLRA with the facts and results of the Pelican Bay litigation will show that such critiques of
federal court power are misguided and that federal judicial intervention is an effective and
legitimate method of prison reform.33
The 1960s and 1970s saw federal judicial intervention in state prisons peak when federal
courts across the Southern states reformed state prison institutions, moving en masse from a
“hands-off” policy to intervention based on the Eighth Amendment.34 Pelican Bay State Prison,
and its numerous constitutional deficiencies, was a model case for federal court intervention.35

27

Id. at 1692 (finding that although inmate suits outnumbered noninmate suits per capita in federal courts that once
state case filings were included that the filing rates for both groups was very similar).
28
See notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
29
ALAN ELSNER, GATES OF INJUSTICE: THE CRISIS IN AMERICA’S PRISONS 22-27, 32 (2004).
30
Id. at 20-22.
31
See id. at 206-07 (noting that ex-felons face other barriers such as exclusion from public assistance benefits,
government housing, diminished employment prospects and exclusion from federal student loan programs).
32
Id. at 32-33.
33
FEELEY, supra note 23, at 50.
34
Id. at 30-51.
35
Cf. id. at 166-67.
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However, Congressional passage of the PLRA36 limited federal court power to intervene in state
prisons through structural reform litigation, wrongly assuming that the need for such intervention
was over.37 Thus, as demonstrated by Madrid 38 and the California prison crises of the last
decade,39 judicial intervention remains the only viable tool to remedy Constitutional deficiencies
in state prisons, because majoritarian political processes fail to produce serious reform.40
Comparing the type of federal court intervention with the ensuing state prison reform provides
evidence of a nexus between intervention and reform: the broader and more intrusive the threat
of judicial action, the more quickly state officials implement reform.41
For example, since Madrid was decided in 1995, the California prison system has
received increased judicial scrutiny as the result of lawsuits brought on behalf of California
prisoners by the Prison Law Office, a public interest law firm located in San Quentin,
California.42 However, until 2004, when Judge Henderson threatened to place the entire state
prison system under the supervision of the federal court,43 state elected officials were unwilling
to act.44 Only since 2004 have the legislature and the governor seriously proposed or enacted

36

Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-134, 10 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3626
and 28 U.S.C. 1932 (1996)).
37
See notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
38
889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
39
Id. at 1169; see discussion infra Part III.A.
40
See discussion infra Part III.A
41
E.g., FEELEY, supra note 23, 73 (quoting an Arkansas state official as saying the state would do “whatever it takes
to get out from under” federal court supervision).
42
The Prison Law Office, located in San Quentin California, has successfully challenged the constitutionality of
prison conditions in a number of contexts including general prison conditions, excessive force, medical care, mental
health care, and parole revocation proceedings. A description of the office and a list of its cases are available at
http://www.prisonlaw.com/ (last visited 03/13/2005).
43
See, e.g., Jenifer Warren, Takeover of State Prisons Is Threatened; a Federal Judge Assails the Schwarzenegger
Administration on Lack of Reform, its Deal with Guards, L.A. TIMES, July 21, 2004, at A1.
44
Inaction by state officials in California is partly attributable to the influence of the California Correctional Peace
Officers Association (CCPOA), see discussion infra Part III.A; see e.g., Franklin Zimring, California Commentary;
A Gulag Mentality in the Prisons; A Burgeoning Population and Powerful Guard Union Allowed Prisons Like
Corcoran to Slip Out of Control, L.A. TIMES, July 16, 1998, at B9; Mark Martin, Guards Union Corrupts Prisons
Report Finds, S.F. CHRON., June 5, 2004, at A1.
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nascent prison reforms.45 Although there are other reasons, including legislative term limits and
the 2003 recall election,46 that help to explain the recent shift towards prison reform, federal
judicial intervention has been a necessary catalyst for institutional change in California’s
prisons.47
This Article examines Madrid, the last case before the passage of the PLRA in which a
federal court broadly intervened in a state prison system through structural reform litigation.48
Part II outlines the historical and jurisprudential foundations that legitimate federal judicial
intervention in state prisons. Part III examines the California prison system through the lens of
the Madrid litigation49 and the ongoing social and political problems caused by the prison crisis.
Part IV concludes that judicial intervention remains the only viable tool to remedy constitutional
deficiencies in state prisons when majoritarian political processes fail to produce serious
reform.50 Therefore, it is essential that the power and independence of the federal judiciary be
preserved to ensure the rights of the politically powerless and mitigate Constitutional harms.
II. CORRECTIONAL REFORM
In a significant speech to the American Bar Association in 2003, Supreme Court Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy implored members of the Bar to pay more attention to the problems of the
nation’s prison systems.51 He noted that one goal of the nation’s current correctional systems is
to “degrade and demean the prisoner” and that this goal is unacceptable in “a society founded on

45

See discussion infra Part III.D.
Id.
47
Id.
48
Madrid may be last serious, ongoing vindication of prisoner’s Constitutional rights in light of the passage of
federal legislation designed to curb prisoner complaints and limit federal court power. See discussion infra Part II.B.
49
889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
50
A note about the scope of this endeavor: given the fluid and ongoing situation in the California correctional crisis,
this study limits itself to the situation as it stood in early 2005.
51
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Keynote Address at the American Bar Association Annual
Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003) at http://www.abanet.org/media/kencomm/amkspeech03.html [hereinafter Kennedy Speech]
(on file with author).
46
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respect for the inalienable rights of the people” – individual Constitutional rights do not end with
incarceration.52 He further called on civil lawyers who “have expertise in coordinating groups,
finding evidence, and influencing government policies” to take up the cause of prison reform
because such lawyers “have great potential to help find more just solutions and more humane
policies” for incarcerated individuals.53
Certainly, many public lawyers have struggled to do as Justice Kennedy proposed: to
ensure the individual Constitutional rights of prisoners through various reform efforts including
litigation.54 Prison litigation has forced federal courts to move from a “hands-off” approach
toward a more interventionist posture regarding prison cases.55 However, assessing the impact
that litigation has on prison systems is difficult because of the complexity of forces operating to
influence any correctional system.56 At the least the shift towards judicial intervention has
resulted in measurable positive changes in state correctional institutions, including the
understanding and internalization of Constitutional standards by correctional officials,57 the
development of bureaucratic policies and procedures designed to ensure compliance with these
standards,58 and finally, increased political and public visibility and awareness of conditions
within correctional institutions.59
A. The History and Evolution of Prison Reform

52

Id.
Id.
54
Susan Sturm, The Legacy and Future of Corrections Litigation, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 639, 691 (1993) (observing
that hundreds of cases have been “brought and won by lawyers on behalf of inmates challenging the conditions and
practices of our nations” correctional institutions).
55
See id. at 659; but see FEELEY, supra note 23, at 39-46 (noting that there were hundreds of civil rights prison cases
brought prior to 1965 before the federal courts began to take them seriously and that the federal courts shifted from
civil rights jurisprudence to an Eighth Amendment jurisprudence thus enabling significant reform litigation to
emerge).
56
Id. at 648.
57
Sturm, supra note 54, at 662.
58
Id. at 667.
59
Id. at 669-70.
53
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Prior to the eighteenth century, punishment operated on the body of the condemned
through public torture, “a gloomy festival of punishment”60 designed to objectify the accused,
demonstrate the state’s power to punish, and to deter crime.61 However, in the late eighteenth
century the modern prison was born,62 and along with it, recurring calls for penal reform. 63 From
the workhouses of England in the early eighteenth century to the Philadelphia model of the
nineteenth century to Bentham’s Panopticon,64 expressions of penal power have historically been
accompanied by internal and external proposals for reform designed to better discipline and
rehabilitate prisoners and to humanize the prison institution.65
This change in penal theory, from public punishment to institutional rehabilitation,
mirrored the evolution of the twentieth century welfare state.66 However, the last quarter century
has seen a swing in the other direction: political rhetoric has shifted from the aspirations of the
social welfare state to a discourse of personal responsibility. Increased State power premised on
crime control and punishment comprise the penal element of political emphasis on person
responsibility.67 This shift in rhetoric, both a symptom and consequence of increased crime rates,

60

MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 8 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977).
Id. at 48-49.
62
See id. at 16 (observing that there has been a “reduction in penal severity” in the period from 1775-1975 as
prisons began to focus less on punishment of the body of the condemned and more on rehabilitation).
63
Id. at 115 (describing the rapid growth of imprisonment as taking up almost the entire field of punishment).
Foucault also traces the history of efforts both internal and external to reform the prison institution over time. Id. at
121-26.
64
See id. at 205 (identifying the Panopticon as a manifestation of state power that has become a “figure of political
technology” and assures surveillance of the subject whether in or out of prison).
65
Id. at 94-98 (identifying six major rules that underlie the power to punish that should be adhered to in order to
obtain maximum results both on the individual and society).
66
Cf. Theodore Caplow & Jonathon Simon, Understanding Prison Policy and Population Trends, 26 CRIME AND
JUST. 63, 70-71 (1999) (indicating that over the course of the New Deal and Great Society eras that rehabilitative
imprisonment was “rationalized as a form of state benefit”).
67
See id. at 70-71 (identifying three factors that underlie changes in U.S. prison population: political culture, public
policy, and institutional organizations). The authors argue that this shift has set in motion a “Reflexivity of the
Penal System” in which the power of prison industries and corrections employees grows as prison population
increases through increases in the numbers of prosecutions and the increasing tendency of parole and probation
officers to return people to prison. Id. at 72-73. Foucault also identified the danger of an increase in disciplinary
mechanisms arguing that such mechanisms have a tendency to “swarm” and to emerge from the “closed fortresses
61
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the “Just Say No” campaign and an ongoing drug war that resulted in a concurrent prisonbuilding boom,68 has resulted in broad acceptance of the notion that politicians must favor
harsher punishments and tougher crime control measures to gain and maintain political power.69
As political discourse and sentiment switched to one of crime-control, so did penal
philosophy – from a model focused on rehabilitation and post-incarceration integration back into
society toward a neo-classic punishment regime designed to punish the body,70 through extralegal methods including the use of excessive force, torture, and retaliation.71 As prisons became
more hidden from public view,72 the possibility of these extra-legal means of punishment
increased and State action further dehumanized “part of the family of humankind.”73 This
dehumanization continued when prisoners were “re-integrated” into a society in which they are
barred from full participation.74
As society began to move from a penal regime focused on rehabilitation to one focused
on punishment and control, federal courts responded by shifting toward a more interventionist,
active posture.75 Federal judges mitigated national social trends toward prison-based physical
punishment and torture, first by enforcing Constitutional norms in Southern prisons through the
[prisons] in which they once functioned and to circulate in a ‘free’ state” in which discipline evolves into ever more
flexible methods of state control. FOUCAULT, supra note 60, at 211.
68
ELSNER, supra note 29, at 18-27.
69
Caplow, supra note 66, at 70 (1999).
70
Cf. FOUCAULT, supra note 60, at 113 (noting the links between prisons and broader society – the notion of the
punitive city).
71
See, e.g., Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1161 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (concluding that the “Eighth Amendment’s
restraint on using excessive force has been repeatedly violated at Pelican Bay); see notes 2-12, 223 and
accompanying text.
72
Pelican Bay is near the town of Crescent City, almost four hundred miles from San Francisco. Id. at 1155.
73
Kennedy Speech, supra note 51.
74
See ELSNER, supra note 29, at 206-07 (noting that ex-felons face other barriers such as exclusion from public
assistance benefits, government housing, diminished employment prospects and exclusion from federal student loan
programs).
75
See generally, FEELEY, supra note 23; see e.g., Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (holding
the lack of medical care to be a willful and intentional violation of both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments);
Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (extending the holding to all conditions within the prisons; the
conditions of confinement violated “any judicial definition of cruel and unusual punishment”); Newman v.
Alabama, 466 F. Supp. 628 (M.D. Ala. 1979) (placing the entire state prison system into receivership after eight
years of willful intransigence by an uncooperative defendant); see notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
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creation of legal doctrine in order to create more “moral” prisons, and then by opening closed
state prison systems where notions of rehabilitation had been discarded in favor of neo-classic
forms of physical torture and control. 76
Federal judges used special masters, experts, and other administrative means in order to
make quasi-administrative decisions to reform prisons.77 In Judicial Policy Making and the
Modern State,78 professors Malcolm Feeley and Edward Rubin argue that the prison cases of the
1960s and 1970s were vital, among other reasons, to eliminate the last vestiges of Southern
slavery by “imposing national standards on state institutions.”79 In order to achieve the reform of
those prisons, federal district court judges used bureaucracy as a coordinating idea with which to
reshape Southern prisons.80 This coordinating idea enabled courts to promulgate standards and
policies to professionalize corrections regimes and enforce individual Constitutional rights.81
Federal courts sought to impose a modern bureaucratic scheme of governance in archaic
Southern state prisons.82 Regardless of methodology, courts sought to bring prisons in line with
evolving standards of civil society by transforming Southern state prisons into institutions that
adhered to national standards.83 In particular, the Southern prison cases fit nicely into that
framework since arguably, the practices and conditions in Southern prisons were the last vestiges
of feudal slave systems of the previous century.84 The imposition of Constitutional norms on

76

Id. at 265 (arguing that the “moral prison” was one of the central “coordinating ideas” that explains why federal
judges suddenly found prison cases to be justiciable within the Eighth Amendment).
77
Id. at 305-11.
78
FEELEY, supra note 23.
79
Id. at 149.
80
Id. at 271 (noting that bureaucratization of prison administration was a second such “coordinating idea”).
81
Id. at 281.
82
Id. at 271.
83
Id. at 166-67.
84
Id. at 151-57.
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state institutions fits into any framework of federal judicial action since judges are the final
enforcers of the constitutional rights of individuals, incarcerated or not.85
B. The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995
Given that federal court intervention in state prisons successfully altered prison life for
hundreds of thousands of prisoners,86 Congress acted to authorize the United States Attorney
General to bring actions against state institutions, including prisons, to secure the Constitutional
rights of individuals through passage of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980
(CRIPA).87 Although Section 1983 actions ensured access to federal courts and achieved
substantial reforms of state prisons,88 CRIPA provided an additional avenue through which the
federal government could intervene to enforce the Constitutional rights of prisoners.89 However,
the United States rarely brought suit under the provisions of CRIPA, leaving Section 1983
actions as the main vehicle for prison conditions and excessive force litigation.90
Although federal judicial intervention remedied conditions of confinement in prisons
across the United States, Congress limited judicial discretion in hearing such claims by enacting
the PLRA.91 The PLRA was enacted in response to a perception among politicians that frivolous

85
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 146-147 (Alexander Hamilton) (Andrew Hacker ed. 1964) (arguing that the federal
judiciary must protect the Constitution and the rights of individuals and minorities from the majority).
86
See notes 56-59, 75-80 and accompanying text.
87
Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 349 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1997-1997i (1980)).
88
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2004).
89
42 U.S.C. § 1997a (2004).
90
U.S. v. State of Mich., 62 F.3d 1418 (1995); U.S. v. State of Hawai’i, 564 F.Supp. 189 (D.Hawai'i, 1983);
(initiating suit over prison conditions); U.S. v. Los Angeles County, 635 F.Supp. 588 (C.D. Cal., 1986) (initiating
suit over conditions at juvenile hall). However, CRIPA has most often been invoked to protect patients in mental
health units and developmentally disabled living centers. See e.g., U.S. v. Com. of Pa., 902 F.Supp. 565 (W.D. Pa.,
1995); U.S. v. State of Or., 839 F.2d 635 (1988) (initiating suits over conditions at state mental health facility); U.S.
v. State of Tenn., 925 F.Supp. 1292 (W.D. Tenn., 1995); U.S. v. State of Conn., 931 F.Supp. 974 (D. Conn., 1996)
(initiating suits against state institution for mentally retarded persons).
91
Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-134, 10 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §
3626 and 28 U.S.C. 1932, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (1996)).

11

prisoner complaints were overloading federal court dockets.92 Political emphasis on the rhetoric
of crime control and punishment drove the enactment of the PLRA.93 In the decade prior to the
enactment of the PLRA, inmate filings in federal court increased during eight of the ten years to
a maximum of 40,000 cases filed in 1995.94 But a comparison of inmate filing rates and the
overall filing rates of the general population showed that inmates were no more litigious than the
general population.95 In introducing the Act, Senator Orrin Hatch, then chair of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, stated the legislation would “bring relief to a civil justice system
overburdened by frivolous prisoner lawsuits” and help “slam shut the revolving door on the
prison gate and to put the key safely out of the reach of overzealous federal courts.”96
Specifically, the PLRA limited prisoner access to federal courts through the amendment
of a provision of CRIPA.97 Previously, a district court had discretion to continue a case in order
to require the prisoner to exhaust all administrative remedies before the case could go forward in
federal court.98 In contrast, the PLRA mandates that a prisoner must exhaust administrative
remedies prior to the commencement of litigation in federal court.99 Requiring prisoners to
exhaust all administrative remedies means that most prisoner suits will never reach federal courts
for two reasons: first, most prisoners proceed pro se100 and second, the exhaustion requirement

92

Ann H. Mathews, Note: The Inapplicability of the Prison Litigation Reform Act to Prisoner Claims of Excessive
Force, 77 N.Y.U.L. REV. 536, 538 (2002).
93
See id. at 1559 (indicating that the PLRA was driven in part by conservative dissatisfaction with “imperial” or
activist judging).
94
Schlanger, supra note 26, at 1558 (noting that inmate litigation took up nineteen percent of the federal civil docket
and that fifteen percent of federal civil trials were civil rights cases brought by inmates).
95
Id. at 1692 (finding that although inmate suits outnumbered noninmate suits per capita in federal courts that once
state case filings were included that the filing rates for both groups was very similar).
96
Id. at 1565 (2003) (quoting Sen. Orrin Hatch in 141 Cong. Rec. S14,418 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995)).
97
42 U.S.C. 1997e (2004).
98
Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 349 § 7 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (1980)).
99
42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2004).
100
David M. Adlerstein, Note: In Need of Correction: The “Iron Triangle” of the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1690 (2001) (noting that “a full ninety-six percent of prisoner Section 1983 suits are
brought pro se, and that eighty-two percent of prisoners are high school dropouts”).
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exposes prisoners to retaliation by prison authorities chilling the possibility of future prison
reform through Section 1983 actions.101
Many commentators have criticized the PLRA as an unnecessary intrusion into the
discretion and inherent powers of federal court judges.102 In addition to removing judicial
discretion concerning the exhaustion of administrative remedies, the Act limits the remedies
available in prisoner civil rights lawsuits.103 The Act also restricts prospective injunctive relief
through a tripartite need, narrowness, and intrusiveness requirement:104 the relief must be
“narrowly drawn” to extend “no further than necessary to correct the violation” and must be the
“least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the federal right.”105
The Act further requires that federal judges limit preliminary injunctive relief to no more
than ninety days,106 limits the types of prophylactic remedies that may be imposed,107 and sets
time limits on the relief,108 requiring that a court may extend prospective relief only by written
findings that prospective relief remains necessary and that such relief is the least intrusive relief
possible to correct the federal right.109 In practice, the needs, narrowness, and intrusiveness
criteria for prophylactic injunctive relief, coupled with automatic termination provisions, mean
that extensive federal intervention in state prisons is a thing of the past.110 The Pelican Bay

101

Mathews, supra note 92, at 555.
See generally William B. Mack III, Justice for Some: Excessive Force Claims after Porter v. Nussle, 36 COLUM.
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 265 (2003); Mathews, supra note 92; Adlerstein, supra note 100.
103
18 U.S.C. § 3626(a) (2004).
104
Id. at § 3626(a)(1)(A) (2004).
105
Id. at § 3626(a)(1)(A) (2004).
106
Id. at § 3626(a)(2) (2004).
107
Id. at § 3626(a)(3) (2004).
108
Id. at § 3626(b) (2004).
109
Id. at § 3626(b)(3) (2004).
110
See discussion supra Part II.B.
102
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Prison case may be last instance where a federal district court has exercised its equitable
discretion to enforce the Constitutional rights of prisoners over an extended period.111
Most critiques of federal court intervention in state prisons misapprehend the problem of
power by focusing on the alleged misuse of federal court power rather than the misuse of power
by prison guards and administrators.112 Judge Henderson’s supervision of Pelican Bay undercuts
the crime control rhetoric that drove passage of the PLRA and the arguments of those who
criticize federal judges as activist.113 Federal courts in these cases match state power that violates
Constitutional norms with federal power only to the extent necessary to end Constitutional
violations.114
The power of the CCPOA within state government and a resistance to change within the
California Department of Corrections (CDC) are recurring themes in the legal texts of the
Pelican Bay case and are real political forces to be reckoned with in attempted reform of the
California correctional system.115 Judge Henderson used the limited power of the district court to
publicize the conditions of confinement of California prisoners, to expose entrenched power
structures resistant to change, to professionalize the CDC, and ultimately, to use federal court
power to transform California’s prison system from a system where power destroys
Constitutional rights into a system that honors those guarantees.116
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C. Legitimacy of Judicial Intervention
Lately, attacks on so-called activist judges have increased as concerns about federal
judicial power have regained currency in lockstep with the resurgence of federalist ideology and
power.117 Critics from both the left and the right have characterized judicial activism as antidemocratic and anti-majoritarian, arguing that judges must interpret, rather than make, the law.118
Past decisions that compelled broad institutional or social reforms, such as Brown v. Board of
Education,119 were particularly criticized at the time they were rendered.120 However, judicial
intervention in state prison systems during the remedial stage of litigation often spurred state
elected officials to act, suggesting that, at least in the context of prison reform litigation, such
criticism of judicial intervention is flawed.121
Judges, particularly Article III judges, are in a unique position to encourage broad
institutional reform. Despite criticism that wide-ranging judicial intervention is anti-democratic
or counter-majoritarian,122 the framers envisioned judicial advancement of unpopular positions
as the final protection of the Constitutional rights of minority groups.123 Because federal judges
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do not have to face the electorate and are insulated from political pressures they may act in ways
that are politically unpopular in order to force needed reforms.124 Although it may be preferable
for local political processes to take care of structural reforms, such changes often languish if not
for federal judicial intervention, as elected officials have little incentive to act on behalf of
politically unpopular minority groups.125
In the context of prison reform, Professors Feeley and Rubin have attacked the social
myths that delineate the proper role of the judge, most notably that judges should only interpret
the law according to existing rules without considering the social results of those decisions.126
They further argue that regardless of whether structural prison reform cases are viewed as policy
making or Constitutional rights enforcement, such decisions are firmly within the powers of the
federal judiciary.127 In analyzing judicial action, Feeley and Rubin define policy making as
“officials exercis[ing] power on the basis of their judgment that their actions will produce
socially desirable results,”128 which means that all judicial decision making is policy making.129
Such interpretive and ongoing judicial decision-making and intervention in state prisons is a

of Rights”); Stephen B. Bright, Speech: Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice be Done Amid Efforts to
Intimidate and Remove Judges From Office for Unpopular Decisions?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 308, 326 (1997) (quoting
Justice Hugo Black describing the Constitutional role of the federal judiciary); RONALD WEICH, AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION, UPSETTING CHECKS AND BALANCES: CONGRESSIONAL HOSTILITY TOWARD THE COURTS IN
TIMES OF CRISIS, 11-17 (2001) available at http://archive.aclu.org/congress/courtstripping.pdf (on file with author).
124
Bright, supra note 123, at 327-29 (noting that the Bill of Rights is “regularly denigrated in political discourse in
the United States today as nothing more than a collection of technicalities. Someone needs to step forward and
remind everyone that the procedural guarantees of the Bill of Rights are fundamental principles”); WEICH, supra
note 123, at 10-13.
125
For example, one commentator argues the reason civil rights cases are mainly enforced by federal rather than
state courts is that elected state court judges are not independent enough to protect the rights of unpopular
minorities, see Stephen B. Bright, Can Judicial Independence be Attained in the South? Overcoming History,
Elections and the Misperceptions About the Role of the Judiciary, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 817 (1998).
126
FEELEY, supra note 23, at 13-17.
127
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 (1978); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 281 (1977); Tracy A. Thomas,
The Prophylactic Remedy: Normative Principles and Definitional Parameters of Broad Injunctive Relief, 52 BUFF.
L. REV. 301, 303-06 (2004); Chayes, supra note 114, at 1282-84.
128
FEELEY, supra note 23, at 5 (noting that Ronald Dworkin, in LAW’S EMPIRE, criticized such action by judges) .
129
Id. at 9.

16

slow process that, over time, results in Constitutional conditions of confinement and the
professionalization of state correctional departments.130
In the Pelican Bay litigation, Judge Henderson’s active role falls within a wellestablished doctrinal framework of prison reform litigation and Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence.131 Judge Henderson used hermeneutic interpretation and mediation to work
towards the creation of a more moral prison system by professionalizing the Pelican Bay Prison
administration, and as the litigation proceeded, realizing that the problems uncovered in the
implementation stage extended throughout the Department and merited a restructuring of the
entire CDC through the use of federal court power.132 Many commentators have defended
prophylactic relief as a legitimate adjudicatory function by federal court judges.133 But even
given the positive results of prison reform litigation, the biggest problem in such litigation is the
enforcement and implementation of court ordered remedies.134
Given the difficulty of institutional change, there is no other effective check on
“correctional institutions other than litigation or the threat of litigation.”135 The “institutional
change model,” targeting “particular institutions or systems with illegal practices” offers the
greatest promise in achieving prison reforms to ensure compliance with Constitutional
standards.136 Additionally, the enforcement of remedies remains a problem, even when society
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acknowledges prison failures.137 Bureaucratic institutions are notoriously difficult to change,138
and prisons are no exception.139 Therefore, plaintiff’s counsel or federal courts,140 must oversee
prisons, as political officials, because of high political costs, are unable to endorse or engage in
substantive prison reform.141 Since state political processes will not protect the Constitutional
rights of prisoners, federal judges must enforce Constitutional norms.142
Although federal courts must enforce the Constitutional rights of prisoners, “no one
familiar with litigation in this area could suggest that the courts have been overeager to usurp the
task of running prisons.”143 Rather, federal courts have stepped in when state officials and
agencies have failed to enforce the Constitutional rights of prisoners and when Constitutional
violations are so egregious as to constitute the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain;”
where “the soul-chilling inhumanity of conditions in American prisons has been thrust upon the
judicial conscience” and became impossible to ignore.144 Faced with these continuing violations
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the Supreme Court has held that District Courts have broad remedial authority to address
Constitutional violations and can modify earlier orders and direct more intrusive relief if such
violations remain uncorrected after the initial order.145 However, the PLRA limited this power
even though prison litigation transformed state prisons in the United States by mandating
Constitutional norms.146 The chilling abuses outlined in Madrid, symptomatic of wider problems
within the CDC, are strong evidence of why passage of the PLRA was a policy mistake.147
III. THE CALIFORNIA CRISIS
Scandal,148 broken promises of systemic reform by prison officials, 149 and increased
tensions between prison guards and prisoners as the prison population grew150 characterized
California’s prison system between 1990 and 2005.151 During the same period, California
politicians, while paying lip service to the notion of reform by creating committees and
commissions to investigate the problems made no effective effort to implement systemic
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change.152 State elected officials abdicated their responsibility to oversee and control the
California Department of Corrections to the CCPOA.153 The only effective efforts at reform –at
Pelican Bay State Prison and Corcoran State Prison – were the result of intervention by the
federal government.154
A.

California’s Prison System and the CCPOA

Vested political interests, including the CCPOA, have captured California’s political
processes, thus federal court intervention remains the only effective mechanism to enforce the
Constitutional rights of California’s prisoners.155 Michael Alpert, chair of California’s “Little
Hoover” Commission,156 advocated a return to a rational rehabilitation system in California’s
state prisons, noting that the practical goal of incarceration should be preventing recidivism157
during testimony to the American Bar Association’s Justice Kennedy Commission.158 However,
such proposals are antithetical to the CCPOA as substantial reforms could lead to fewer
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prisoners, fewer new prisons and prison guards, and a concurrent weakening in the political
power of the union.159
State Senator Gloria Romero, Chair of the Senate Select Committee on the California
Correctional System and author of a number of bills introduced to reform the CDC during the
2003-2004 legislative term, expressed concern about the CCPOA’s undue influence.160 Intense
lobbying by the CCPOA killed most of Senator Romero’s bills, leading the Senator to declare
that “justice took a walk” when SB 1731, which would have overturned a clause in the CCPOA’s
contract which currently requires all information, including the accuser’s name, to be turned over
to the guard under investigation prior to the commencement of the inquiry, was voted down.161
CCPOA power is such that it only need remind a legislator of the political cost of appearing soft
on crime and threaten to withhold political campaign contributions in the next election cycle in
order to obtain cooperation.162
The CCPOA has the most at stake in any attempted reform of California’s prison
system.163 Because of this, the union has been the most resistant to any reform perceived as
weakening the CCPOA’s control of the prison system.164 Inmate complaints about guard
misconduct had to be disclosed to the guard in question prior to the initiation of any
159
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investigation, and correctional officers have had little to fear from internal investigations.165
This requirement has likely had a chilling effect on prisoner complaints, as retribution by guards
is almost certain after a prisoner files a complaint.166 The recent creation of an independent
Bureau of Review to investigate allegations of guard misconduct and excessive force threatens to
make inroads on CCPOA power.167 Observers hope the Bureau will be able to undertake
independent investigations of correctional officer wrongdoing free of the improper influence that
has marked past investigations of correctional officer wrongdoing.168 Until recently, the political
influence of the CCPOA has blocked this type of reform.169
The politically connected union exercises the kind of “raw power and privilege” only
possible in a society where criminal punishment is the prevailing political motif.170 The coercive
power of the CCPOA in the halls of prisons and the state Capitol is troubling in a state that once
pioneered a “national model for prison-based rehabilitation” under then Governor Earl
Warren.171 In a critique of the current system, the Little Hoover Commission concluded that real
change depended upon whether “California’s leaders have the will to make the policy choices
based on evidence rather than ideology, on facts rather than fears.”172 Over the last two decades,
California’s political leaders made policy choices based on ideology and political expedience
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rather than the rule of law leaving federal courts to remedy Constitutional deficiencies and to
push for real reform in California’s prisons.173
B. Federal Judicial Reform
Pelican Bay State Prison’s Secure Housing Unit, the subject of Madrid v. Gomez, 174 was
designed to better control the most dangerous prisoners within the California correctional
system.175 CDC designed the SHU to house “the worst of the worst” and since prison authorities
accept the syllogism that guards are only as violent as the inmates warrant, this has led to a host
of Constitutional violations at Pelican Bay.176
Because of his unique role as an Article III judge, Judge Thelton Henderson could begin
the job of prison reform at Pelican Bay by undertaking an impartial evaluation of prisoner
claims, and in doing so publicize their plight while maintaining the legitimacy of judicial
intervention and upholding a core principle of the Eighth Amendment.177 Thus, Judge Henderson
acted within a well-established doctrinal framework of federal judicial intervention in state
prison systems established by earlier prison cases to vindicate the Constitutional rights of
incarcerated prisoners at Pelican Bay.178 The relevant legal standard for Judge Henderson’s
decision was the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment to the
Constitution. The Supreme Court has held that the prohibition against such punishment applies to
conditions of incarceration – the Constitution “retains its ‘full force’ behind prison doors.”179
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Prison administrators and guards must treat inmates as full human beings: “there is no place for
abuse or mistreatment, even in the darkest of jailhouse cells.”180 Society punishes prisoners
through incarceration, not by unnecessarily cruel treatment once jailed.181
The Pelican Bay case differs from the Southern prison cases in several important
respects. The Southern prison cases were important because prison reforms were the final step of
the process of national re-integration begun with reconstruction.182 The judges in the Southern
prison cases sought to impose national social values upon state prisons by requiring prison
administration conformity to accepted bureaucratic patterns and practices183 resulting in more
moral prisons.184 In contrast, the Pelican Bay case sought to restrain a runaway correctional
system where the CCPOA, rather than agency directors and prison wardens, ran the CDC.185
Where Southern prisons had little or no modern bureaucratic institutions to control guards
and inmates, California’s CDC has both too much and too little bureaucracy.186 For example,
there is too much bureaucracy in the prisoner classification and assignment process but far too
little bureaucracy in providing adequate medical care to prisoners.187 Recently, the state admitted
that prison medical care is a “broken system” and state officials warmed to the idea of a federal
court takeover.188 Ideally, political processes should have modernized the bureaucracy within
CDC to comply with modern administrative practices and procedures and prevent a recapture of
the management system by the CCPOA.189 However, given that the political process had failed
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to produce such reform and ensure accountability, the only effective way to reform the CDC was
through federal court intervention.190
1. The Eighth Amendment
Over the last half-century, the United States Supreme Court has developed modern
normative principles in the prison context to govern the previously non-justiciable “cruel and
unusual punishment clause” of the Eighth Amendment.191 These principles have
Constitutionalized the nature of state punishment and prison conditions and include the right to
adequate medical care,192 the right to freedom from punitive or retaliatory physical force,193 and
the right to freedom from confinement where the totality of prison conditions and practices are
so bad that they are “shocking to the conscience of reasonably civilized people.”194 For two
decades beginning in the mid 1960s the Court decided a number of prison condition cases that
claimed Eighth Amendment violations.195 The Court developed flexible tests to determine
whether a condition or practice constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, allowing or mandating
federal court intervention in order to enforce the Constitution behind prison walls.196 The
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United States Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has evolved over the last half
century, with an eye toward the evolving standards of civilized society.197 Prisons need not be
comfortable places but neither may they deprive their inhabitants of basic Constitutional
protections.198 Prisoner Constitutional rights include the right to the minimum necessities of life
including “food, clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.”199
In assessing claims of cruel and unusual punishment, courts must inquire into both
objective and subjective factors.200 Generally, a prison official who acts reasonably cannot face
liability under the Eighth Amendment.201 The objective component of the test for cruel and
unusual punishment is an inquiry into the seriousness of the infliction of pain – the harm must be
sufficiently serious in order to implicate the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the
Constitution.202 The subjective component is an inquiry into prison officials’ state of mind to
establish that the pain inflicted was “unnecessary and wanton.”203 The court determines the
objective component as a matter of law while the subjective component is a question of fact
satisfied through proof of deliberate indifference, a standard equivalent to proof of subjective
recklessness in criminal cases.204 However, whenever a prisoner alleges excessive force against
individual prison guards the standard of proof is higher; the prisoner must show more than
deliberate indifference.205 The “core judicial inquiry [becomes] whether force was applied in a
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good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause
harm.”206
Judge Thelton Henderson characterized the question presented to the court in Madrid as
whether or not the defendants “[had] a policy of permitting and condoning a pattern of excessive
force and whether that policy is attributable to a culpable state of mind” rather than simply ruling
on the validity of prison regulations ostensibly designed to restore order or the legality of any
individual guard’s actions in regard to the use of excessive force.207 This characterization
allowed the judge to apply the lower culpability standard: deliberate indifference rather than the
more stringent malicious and sadistic standard.208 Further, this characterization also allowed the
judge to find that defendant prison administration officials had not dealt with conspicuous
Constitutional shortcomings in the operation of Pelican Bay Prison and that such deficiencies
required extensive judicial supervision, mandating the appointment of a special master to aid
prison authorities during the remedial stage of the litigation and to modernize the prison
bureaucracy.209
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on the use of excessive physical force “ha[d] been
repeatedly violated at Pelican Bay ... [where the] force applied was so strikingly disproportionate
to the circumstances” that it clearly contravened Constitutional norms.210 Further, the level of
force was “open, acknowledged, tolerated, and sometimes expressly approved” by the prison
administration, thus meeting the standard of “deliberate indifference.”211 In the words of one
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expert, “I have never observed ... the level of officially sanctioned unnecessary and excessive
force that exist[ed]” at Pelican Bay Prison.212
2. MADRID V. GOMEZ
In Madrid, prisoners alleged a pattern of excessive force and sought to show that prison
officials acted with deliberate indifference and malicious intent.213 The rise of the supermaximum security prison214 over the last quarter-century has produced tension between the
state’s desire to control the most dangerous of prisoners by transferring them to supermax
facilities and the problems that come with concentrating the most egregious offenders in one
facility215 rather than throughout a prison system. A “supermax” institution is always close to
spiraling out of control as the level of violence between guards and inmates increases.216
Proponents of supermax facilities characterize them as efficient, claiming that guards are only as
violent as an inmate population warrants, justifying the use of maximum rather than minimum
force in any given situation, and reinforcing perpetual instability and violence within prison
walls.217 However, in denying excessive force problems, prison authorities enable the “code of
silence” that prevents staff reporting of abuse of inmates to persist.
Judge Henderson addressed the requirement of a moral prison that comported with
Constitutional values using several techniques. First, Judge Henderson characterized the
prisoner’s claim as a case about “fellow human beings -- most of whom will one day return to
212
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society ... [who have] ‘human dignity.’”218 In restoring humanity to prisoners generally
dehumanized by prison conditions and demonized by political rhetoric, Judge Henderson recast
the issue as implicating both fundamental human rights and Constitutional violations. Second,
Judge Henderson’s acknowledgement of a common human bond served to bridge the gap
between those within and those without the prison’s walls while tacitly destabilizing accepted
governmental structures, calling for renewed vigilance by the public, and critically re-examining
the links between prison power and Constitutional values.219 Finally, Judge Henderson
undertook a lengthy recitation of the facts, detailing numerous and egregious Constitutional
violations over the course of eighty-nine pages of the Federal Supplement.220 The facts presented
are so abysmal that only a few pages into the opinion it is clear that something had gone horribly
wrong at Pelican Bay and perhaps throughout the CDC.221
The judicial text opened a previously closed system in which secrecy, autonomy, and
total power by guards over prisoners facilitated persecution through corporal punishment and
violent retaliation rather than discipline and rehabilitation.222 Prisoners have greater value than
as objects for the exercise of state power: “the ‘mind’ [is more than] a surface of inscription for
power” and the body as the device through which that power is inscribed.223 The language of the
opinion underscored the seriousness of the Constitutional violations and the importance of the
recognition that prisoners are part of the polity; prisoners, although temporarily removed from
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society by the state, are eventually returned to civilization and must be viewed and treated as part
of society.224
In evaluating conditions within the SHU Judge Henderson noted, “all humans are
composed of more than flesh and bone -- even those who, because of unlawful and deviant
behavior, must be locked away not only from their fellow citizens, but from other inmates as
well.”225 The opinion outlined events that buttressed the legal conclusion that severe
Constitutional violations had occurred and were likely to continue to occur at Pelican Bay.226
Judge Henderson continually juxtaposed the overarching theme of shared common humanity and
individual Constitutional rights with the regimen of pain and deprivation in the SHU to
underscore the seriousness of the issue.227 The court distinguished the use of force in this case
from “normal disciplinary channels” which defendants were entitled to use in administering the
prison.228 Plaintiff’s experts testified that punishment at Pelican Bay was: “repugnant and
humiliating,” “a ritual of inflicting punishment,” “grossly excessive, utterly unbelievable, and
without parallel in present-day American corrections.”229 The constant reminder of a common
human bond deepened and humanized the factual scenarios that included tales of beatings and
other physical abuse by guards that rose to the level of torture and motivated solely by the desire
for revenge or retaliation,230 willful deprivations of Constitutionally mandated medical231 and
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mental health care,232 routine and systematic use of maximum rather than minimum force in
everyday situations,233 a “code of silence” that pervaded the internal prison culture,234 and a blind
eye to all of these problems by prison administrators, wardens, and those within the CDC who
were mandated to undertake internal investigations into such violations.235
According to Judge Henderson, the defendants, after lengthy litigation, had yet to
acknowledge there was a problem within the prison, and worse had shown no tendency to
attempt to remedy any of the Constitutional violations described at trial.236 Because of these facts
and because of a previous pattern of “delay and obstruction”237 by state prison officials, Judge
Henderson appointed a special master to oversee institutional reform and to work with plaintiffs
and defendants to devise a remedial plan.238 By employing a special master, extending the
remedial stage of the litigation, and expanding the scope of federal court intrusion, Judge
Henderson attempted further reform of CDC management just as federal judges in the 1970s in
Constitutionalized state prison systems in Arkansas, Alabama, and Texas.239
C. Internal Results of Judicial Intervention
The special master appointed by Judge Henderson in 1995 issued a final report in the
spring of 2004.240 The special master concluded that after nine years of Court monitoring and
supervision, repeated special inquiries, and federal prosecutions of prison employees by the
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Department of Justice that “fundamental changes in leadership, operations, and attitudes are
necessary before the [CDC] achieves compliance with the Court’s use of force remedial
orders.”241 The special master recommended further court oversight and intervention to be sure
that the defendants continue to move towards compliance with the remedial plan.242 The special
master found undisputed evidence of continued violations of court orders and noted the
intransigence of CDC officials who “characterize their misconduct as gross incompetence and
negligence rather than deliberate actions.”243
The problems at Pelican Bay remain largely unabated, but by far the most serious
concern for both the court and the special master is the “code of silence” within the department
facilitated by the growth in external political and internal administrative power of the CCPOA.244
Increased power of the CCPOA is well documented245 as is the inability of CDC officials to
discipline prison guards for excessive force complaints and other Constitutional violations.246
Finally, the special master concluded that the problems at Pelican Bay “exist at other CDC
prisons” and “emanate from the CDC’s Central Office in Sacramento, which serves all
prisons.”247 Continued gross contraventions of the Eighth Amendment at California prison
institutions other than Pelican Bay illustrate both the dichotomy between problems of penal
administration and the goals of effective punishment and the lack of serious reform.248
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D. External Results of Judicial Intervention
Although the CDC as an institution remains resistant to serious reform, making progress
only in fits and starts,249 federal court intervention has substantially changed conditions within
Pelican Bay Prison250 and has brought the issue of prison reform to the forefront of state
politics.251 Pelican Bay is an entirely different prison today from the one Judge Henderson toured
in 1994.252 The transformation of Pelican Bay from a prison where gross abuse of prisoners was
routine to one where prison officials honor Constitutional rights was only the first step in altering
the way the CDC operates.253 Judge Henderson’s decision and ongoing oversight substantially
transformed Pelican Bay itself into a prison where the staff takes pride in their level of
professionalism.254 It is no longer necessary for the federal court to exercise tight oversight and
control of day-to-day operations because of the fundamental changes in prison operations.255
However, the problems that do remain cannot be solved at the level of prison operations but are
indicative of larger problems that permeate the CDC.256
In 2004, after the recall election of then Governor Gray Davis, state politicians began to
pay serious attention to the systemic problems within the CDC. Governor Schwarzenegger and
State Senators Gloria Romero and Jackie Speier began to work seriously on transforming the
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way California’s prisons are run.257 The newly elected Governor appointed former guard Rod
Hickman as the Secretary of the Youth and Adult Correctional Agency (YACA) and Jeanne
Woodford, former warden of San Quentin and known as a strong advocate for prisoner
rehabilitation, as the new director of the CDC.258 Both appear committed to substantial reform
but face serious obstacles, including entrenched bureaucracy, the undue influence of the
CCPOA, a culture of silence and cover-up surrounding allegations of prison guard misconduct
coupled with bureaucratic resistance to change.259 The slow pace of reform, coupled with
formidable structural obstacles, led Judge Henderson to threaten a federal court takeover of the
CDC midway through 2004.260
While ongoing crisis within the CDC marked 2004, the year also presented an
opportunity for nascent reform. The California State Senate held special committee hearings.261
Legislators introduced twenty-eight prison reform related bills, and Governor Schwarzenegger
signed seventeen of those bills, including some opposed by the CCPOA.262 The Governor
appointed the Deukmejian Commission to investigate and recommend systemic reforms.263 The
executive branch began to implement reforms including a restructuring of YACA and the
creation of an Independent Bureau of Review264 to investigate allegations of correctional officer
wrongdoing outside of the CCPOA’s sphere of influence and corruption.265

257

Mark Arax & Jenifer Warren, Despite State Promises, Reform Eludes Prisons; Court and State Senators are
Investigating Cover-up Allegations, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2003, at B1.
258
Jenifer Warren, Prison Guard Turned Boss Presses for Reform, L.A. TIMES, March 18, 2004, at A1; Editorial,
State Prisons’ Revolving Door, L.A. TIMES, April 15, 2004, at B14.
259
Pamela J. Podger, Promises to fix State Prisons have been Heard Before, S.F. CHRONICLE, Jan. 24, 2004, at A1.
260
See e.g., Jahna Berry, Jeff Chorney & Jill Duman, Judge Threatens Federal Oversight for State Prisons, THE
RECORDER, July 21, 2004, at 1.
261
Editorial, A Prison System in Disarray, S.F. CHRONICLE, Jan. 19, 2004, at B6.
262
Warren, supra note 240.
263
Mark Martin, Deukmejian to Lead Prison Review Panel, S.F. CHRONICLE, March 16, 2004, at A17.
264
Warren, supra note 240.
265
Patt Morrison, Union Knows all About Crime, but Nothing About Punishment, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2004, at B3
(recounting the fact that one associate warden who attempted reform was forced to ask for protection from the
California Highway Patrol).

34

Unfortunately, some improvements have already begun to deteriorate in 2005 due to the
slow pace of change and the continued opposition of the CCPOA.266 The plan to reorganize and
rename YACA,267 creating a Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, is set to be approved
by the California Legislature but observers question whether centralizing control of the system
will prove to an adequate solution.268 The plan makes wardens accountable to the executive
branch and attempts to insulate prison management from political pressures including CCPOA
influence.269 State Senator Romero believes that reorganization of this nature “won’t stop the
scandals” but gives “this governor credit for having the internal fortitude to deal with prison
reform.”270 Further, the advocacy of victim’s rights groups funded by the CCPOA has stymied
other reforms scheduled to take place including alternative sanctions for parole violators.271
Sustained political attention to the problems in California’s prison system requires
political courage. Whether California politicians are able to continue the recent nascent shift
toward rehabilitation and humane prison conditions remains to be seen. Regardless, federal
courts will continue to exercise oversight and monitoring to ensure Constitutional conditions of
confinement in the areas of prison overcrowding,272 excessive force complaints,273 medical274
and mental health care,275 and parolee procedural due process rights. 276 Although federal court
intervention may not have directly caused recent political attempts at reform; the publicity
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generated by federal court action and subsequent exposure of systemic abuses contributed to
steps by both the California legislative and executive branches to attempt a transformation of the
CDC bureaucracy. The state is finally acting – albeit ten years after serious federal judicial
intervention began.
IV. CONCLUSION
The shift from modern penal systems, which focused on individual rehabilitation and
preparation for re-integration into general society, to a neo-classical mode in which state power
accumulates at the expense of the individual, has resulted in a “reflexivity of the penal system”
where the power of both prison industries and corrections employees grows as prison
populations increase.277 Increased prison power is then further reinforced by heightened
prosecutions for what were previously minor offenses and by the tendency of parole and
probation officers to return parolees to prison for technical violations.278
Although lawyers and public interest law groups have undertaken structural prison
reform litigation since the 1960s, there has been a resurgence of claims of prisoner abuse over
the last decade as the systematic use of excessive force, punishment, and retaliation by prison
guards to control prisoners becomes more widespread.279 If prisons map the “social body,” this
diachronic trend away from rehabilitation and back toward physical discipline and punishment
threatens the legal and social order.280 Increased government control and abuse of prisoners
leads to increased government control and abuse of individuals outside prison walls.281
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Torture was classically condoned by the state as the regulated production of pain in a
ritualized setting,282 but at Pelican Bay, physical violence by guards against inmates was
prevalent and systematic, used by prison guards and administrators to establish their power rather
than for any legitimate penological purpose.283 Judge Henderson sought to bring the prison, and
eventually the CDC, back into line with accepted penal practices and within the scope of the
Eighth Amendment’s evolving standards of civilized society.
The prisoner-guard conflict at Pelican Bay mirrors the ongoing tension between state
power and individual rights while illustrating the problem of excessive power in closed
institutions: “there must be a principle of moderation for the power of punishment” lest
unrestrained state power filter into the rest of the social order.284 Legal texts and judicial
intervention, rather than the political process, may be the only effective ways to mediate the
power of prison officials with the rights of prisoners, especially when felons are shut out of the
political process through disfranchisement and political pragmatism; it is the rare elected official
who can take up the mantle of prison reform without judicial prodding.285 In the words of Justice
William Brennan:
Those who we would banish from society
or from human community itself often speak
in too faint a voice to be heard above society’s
demand for punishment. It is the particular role
of courts to hear these voices, for the Constitution
declares that the majoritarian chorus may not alone
dictate the conditions of social life.286
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Federal judges, in the context of structural prison reform litigation, have compelled
remedies of Constitutional deficiencies and the enforcement of individual Constitutional rights
when the political process has failed.287 The recent California experience shows that intervention
in state institutions by federal courts is justified to protect the Constitutional rights of those shut
out of the political process.288 Prisoners are one such class.
Without the publicity generated by the Pelican Bay Prison case, it is likely that
Constitutional violations of prisoner civil rights by California prison guards and administrators
would have continued.289 Judge Henderson’s actions, culminating in a threatened takeover of
California’s prisons, resulted in real steps toward reform by California’s legislative and
executive branches.290 However, whether such reforms are implemented remains to be seen.
The Pelican Bay case illustrates a national ambivalence toward federal judicial power.
The tension between the tenets of democratic elections and the dictates of the Constitution is
exemplified by Judge Henderson’s actions. Continued critiques of activist federal judges may
lead to fewer judges willing to endure such criticism and take the steps required to remedy
violations of our individual Constitutional rights. Judicial independence continues to be
threatened – California’s prisons demonstrate why such independence is necessary.
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